1.1. Core Principles of Political Realism and the Cold War Context
Political realism, as a theory in international relations, provides an essential lens through which the events and dynamics of the Cold War can be understood. At the heart of realism is the notion that states act primarily in pursuance of their security and interests as they operate within an anarchic international system (Waltz, 1979). It is the structure of this system, along with the distribution of power, that dictates the behavior of states. The onset of the Cold War exemplified the realist paradigm by showcasing how the United States and the Soviet Union acted out of national interest to maintain their security and power within an international arena devoid of a central authority.
Morgenthau’s “Politics Among Nations” serves as a foundational text for modern realism and has significantly influenced how scholars interpret the Cold War (Morgenthau, 1948). Morgenthau argued that the desire for power is a fundamental trait of human nature, which in turn is manifested through the actions of states. During the Cold War, this translated to a relentless struggle for power between the U.S. and the USSR, as each sought to ensure its emergence as the dominant superpower. The consequent ideological, political, and military confrontations were all underpinned by the realist assertion of the quest for survival and dominance.
Thucydides’ analysis of the Peloponnesian War lends a form of classical realism and offers an early articulation of the concept of the security dilemma, where the measures a state takes to increase its security can inadvertently provoke fears in other states, thereby increasing international tensions (Thucydides & Hobbes, 1628). The nuclear arms race during the Cold War illustrates this concept clearly, with each bloc perceiving the other’s accumulation of weapons as a direct threat, which in turn prompted further arms development.
Kenneth Waltz’s theory of neorealism, particularly his concept of structural realism, redirects the attention from human nature and state behavior to the international system’s structure (Waltz, 1979). According to Waltz, the bipolar structure of the Cold War, characterized by two superpowers, led to a relatively stable competition where the balance of power dynamics prevailed. Both the U.S. and the USSR anchored their strategies in military capabilities and strategic alliances to deter the other, aligning with realist perspectives on balance of power as a driving force in international relations.
The doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) is another realist principle manifested during the Cold War. It suggested that both superpowers had the capability to destroy each other and thus were deterred from initiating conflict, particularly nuclear war (Snyder, 1984). This strategic perception is rooted in realism’s prioritization of survival; neither side could afford the existential costs of nuclear aggression, which fostered a precarious but enduring peace.
An analysis of the Cold War through the realist lens highlights the prominence of power politics, national interest, and security concerns. Political realism, with its acceptance of competition and conflict as inherent features of international relations, offers a compelling framework for understanding the complex interplay between the U.S. and the USSR that defined the era.
1.2 Realist Interpretation of Superpower Motivations
The realist school of international relations provides a particular lens through which the motivations of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War can be understood. According to realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, the actions of states are driven by rational actors seeking to maximize their national interest, defined primarily in terms of power (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979). This perspective provides a framework for interpreting the superpowers’ motivations as grounded in the pursuit of power, security, and influence.
From a realist point of view, the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union can be seen as fundamentally shaped by the anarchic nature of the international system. Without a centralized global authority to enforce rules and resolve disputes, self-help becomes the principal mechanism for state survival (Waltz, 1979). For both superpowers, accumulating military strength and securing strategic spheres of influence were not mere acts of aggression but necessary steps for survival in a system where potential threats could emerge at any turn.
The doctrine of containment, articulated by George F. Kennan, underscores the realist interpretation of American motivations. Kennan’s analysis recommended the United States employ a strategy to prevent the spread of Soviet influence through counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, consistent with the balance of power principle (Kennan, 1947). This strategy emanates directly from the realist assertion that maintaining a balance of power is crucial to ensure one’s security and to prevent a potential hegemon from dominating the system.
On the Soviet side, the expansion of its ideological influence through the support of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and beyond can also be viewed through a realist lens. The Soviet Union’s actions were driven by a desire to create a buffer zone against potential attacks from the West—a rational strategy for enhancing its security environment (Gaddis, 1978). Moreover, the Soviets sought to project their power and cement their status as a global superpower, competing for influence in various regions worldwide.
Realism also addresses the importance of national capabilities in understanding superpower behavior during the Cold War. The material capabilities underpinning U.S. and Soviet strategies—evidenced by the nuclear arms race and space race—underscore that power is not only about military might but also encompasses economic and technological dimensions (Waltz, 1979). The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) development and the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union, followed by the American Apollo program, reflect the importance each side placed on demonstrating their capabilities to maintain or alter the global balance of power.
This realist interpretation of superpower motivations during the Cold War also considers the role of misperceptions and the security dilemma. Actions taken by one superpower to increase its security often led the other to perceive an increase in the threat to its own security, resulting in an escalation of tensions and an arms race (Jervis, 1976). The cycle of action and reaction can be seen in the deployment of missiles in Europe and the competition for influence in regions like Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
In summary, realism elucidates the motivations of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War by framing their rivalry as a power struggle in an anarchic international system. Realism not only helps explain the behavior of both superpowers concerning military and ideological expansion but also provides insights into how the security dilemma and balance of power dynamics played out, shaping the global geopolitical landscape for decades.
2.1 The Balance of Power and the Arms Race
The concept of the balance of power is central to realist theory in international relations and provides a crucial lens for analyzing the dynamics of the Cold War, particularly the arms race. Realists assert that states act in rational self-interest to ensure their survival and maintain their position in an anarchic international system. Accordingly, the Cold War can be viewed as a grand illustration of this principle, with two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, engaging in a relentless struggle for strategic dominance (Waltz, 1979).
The arms race between the two Cold War adversaries was not merely about accumulating more weapons; it was fundamentally about deterring the other side through a credible threat of retaliation. Realists, such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, have argued that nuclear deterrence was the ultimate manifestation of the balance of power, as it created a situation where neither the US nor the Soviet Union could afford to launch a first strike without ensuring their own destruction – the so-called ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ (MAD) doctrine (Mearsheimer, 1990).
This incessant competition for power and security is well-explained by realism’s emphasis on self-help and power maximization. As each side sought to offset the other’s advances, this led to cycles of security dilemmas, wherein the actions taken by one superpower to enhance its security prompted the other to respond in kind. For instance, the Soviet Union’s development of the Sputnik satellite prompted the United States to accelerate its own space and missile programs, illustrating the realist concept of the security dilemma in action (Jervis, 1978).
The role of alliances, another key element of the balance of power emphasized by realists, was also significant during the Cold War. NATO and the Warsaw Pact were not simply political entities but were alliances built to amass and project power against each other. Historically, realists have suggested that alliances are a temporary coming together of states with common interests, primarily against a perceived threat (Schweller, 1994). The US and Soviet-led alliances were thus prime examples of this realist proposition, solidifying the bipolar world order and contributing to the overarching structure of the international system during the Cold War era.
In examining the arms race, realism offers insights into why it continued even after both sides had secured a second-strike capability sufficient enough to deter a nuclear war. The theory posits that states pursue power not just for security, but also to attain a position of dominance. As such, the United States and the Soviet Union were motivated by the potential of technological and strategic advantages that could be leveraged in crises or negotiations – a concept echoing the realist belief in the perpetual struggle for power in international politics.
Ultimately, the Cold War arms race was a natural consequence of the anarchy described by realists whereby states, lacking any supra-national authority to regulate their actions, must continuously vie for power to safeguard their own existence. In this context, the arms race represented both a symptom and a catalyst of the broader geopolitical tensions that defined the Cold War, demonstrating realism’s relevance in analyzing this defining period of the 20th century.
2.2. Proxy Wars and Realpolitik
Realism, as a theoretical lens in international relations, prioritizes the concept of power and self-interest among states. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a global competition for dominance that was often channeled through proxy wars in various regions. These indirect conflicts represent a quintessential example of realpolitik, the practice of power politics without ideological pretensions.
Proxy wars, such as those in Korea, Vietnam, Angola, and Afghanistan, are illustrative cases where realism can elucidate the underlying dynamics. For realists, states, particularly great powers, operate in an anarchic international system, where there is no overarching authority to regulate their conduct (Morgenthau, 1948). Consequently, superpowers are driven by national interests that often lead to conflicts by proxy as a means to influence geopolitical regions without direct confrontation (Waltz, 1979). The United States and the Soviet Union supported opposing sides in these regional conflicts as a way to extend their spheres of influence and contain the other’s power.
Henry Kissinger, a strong proponent of realist principles, played a significant role in expanding this strategy during his tenure as the United States’ National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. Kissinger’s policies were characterized by a detachment from moral considerations, focusing instead on strategic interests, which is a practical manifestation of realpolitik. His approach to foreign policy, particularly in Vietnam and the Yom Kippur War, prioritized the balance of power over ideological solidarity (Kissinger, 1994).
Realists argue that the outcomes of these proxy wars reaffirmed the centrality of power politics. Neither side achieved a conclusive victory; instead, they exemplified the concept of the security dilemma, where increased efforts by one side to enhance security, through military buildups or political maneuvering, contribute to heightened insecurity and possible arms escalation by the other (Jervis, 1978). This was evident in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which prompted a significant increase in U.S. military assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen, ultimately contributing to the protracted nature of the conflict and the Soviet withdrawal.
The end of Cold War proxy wars, like the Vietnam conflict, demonstrated a realist perspective on the limits of power projection. Despite superior military technology and economic resources, the United States failed to secure a decisive victory. This exemplifies another cornerstone of realism—the constraints placed on power and the unpredictable nature of military conflict (Schweller, 1998).
Realism offers a framework that can help one comprehend the intricate dynamics of the Cold War’s proxy wars. It provides an explanation for why superpowers would choose to support third-party conflicts and how such endeavors fit into the larger strategic landscape of international politics.
Moreover, the realist conception of national interest over ideological affinity can help in understanding why certain alliances were formed and abandoned during the Cold War period. The U.S. abandonment of South Vietnam in 1975 or the Soviet Union’s ultimate withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 are cases where the exhaustion of national interests and the reevaluation of geopolitical strategies led to a realignment of relationships.
In essence, proxy wars and realpolitik during the Cold War highlight the struggle for power and security in an anarchic international system. Realism, as a theory, emphasizes that even though the ideologies of democracy and communism were foregrounded in the rhetoric of the Cold War, the actual motivations of state actions lay in the perpetual quest for security and the preservation of national interests.
3.1. The Collapse of Bipolarity and Realist Predictive Limitations
The realist perspective offers a compelling framework for understanding international relations, including the events leading to the abrupt end of the Cold War. Realism, with its emphasis on power, competition, and survival of states within an anarchic international system, provides essential insights into why the seemingly entrenched bipolar system between the United States and the Soviet Union came to an unexpected conclusion.
Realism posits that states act primarily in pursuit of their own interests, seeking to maximize power and security. From a realist standpoint, the bipolar structure of the Cold War was maintained by the mutual desire of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to achieve security through balance—each power preventing the other from achieving hegemony. Waltz (1979) famously argued that the bipolar system was inherently stable given the predictability of the superpowers’ actions and strategies. However, the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union did not align well with the idea of perpetual balance, challenging realist conceptions of international order.
Mearsheimer (1990), a prominent realist theorist, acknowledged that the stability of bipolar systems is not indefinite and that internal economic, political, and social factors play a crucial role in the power of a state. The stagnation of the Soviet economy, coupled with the burdensome costs of the arms race and the Afghanistan war, aligns with this analysis. Myriad internal stressors eventually undermined the Soviet Union’s ability to compete with the United States, contributing to the weakening of one pole in the bipolar system.
Additionally, realists such as Morgenthau (1948) emphasized the importance of a national interest defined in terms of power. The reformist policies of Mikhail Gorbachev—perestroika and glasnost—were attempts to restructure the Soviet economy and open up the political system. These policies, although ultimately destabilizing, can be seen through a realist lens as efforts to preserve the Soviet Union’s position as a superpower by modernizing and trying to prevent internal decay.
The suddenness of the Soviet collapse also highlighted the predictive limitations of realism. Realism traditionally downplayed the role of ideologies and domestic politics in shaping state behavior, focusing instead on power dynamics and the international system’s structure. According to realist thought, the ideological confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was merely a reflection of their power rivalry. Yet, the critical role of nationalistic movements within the USSR, the desire of Eastern European satellites for freedom, and the spread of democratic ideas suggest that realism’s preoccupation with power and security as the central axes might overlook other significant factors leading to the end of the Cold War.
Another critical factor that realism struggled to account for is the role of leadership and individual decision-making. While realist theories often discount the impact of individual leaders in favor of systemic pressures, the actions taken by individuals such as Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev played undeniable roles in ending the Cold War. The personal diplomacy, shifts in strategies, and the human element of leadership challenge the realist assertion that state behavior is predictable based on systemic structure and relative power calculations alone.
In conclusion, while realism effectively illuminates many aspects of the Cold War’s dynamics, the theory encounters limitations when confronted with the complexity of political, economic, and ideational forces that contributed to the end of the bipolar standoff. The realist expectation of a stable bipolarity did not encompass the rapid and relatively peaceful resolution of the Cold War, indicating that realism, while useful, is not an all-encompassing predictive or explanatory tool in the realm of international relations.
3.2. Lessons from Realism Following the Cold War Aftermath
The end of the Cold War brought with it an air of triumphalism in the West, particularly regarding the apparent victory of liberal democracy and market capitalism. However, from a realist perspective, the period following the dissolution of the Soviet Union served as a fertile ground for reflecting on the enduring principles of international relations and the lessons that could be drawn from realism. Realists emphasize the continuity of power politics, even in a unipolar environment, and stress that the dynamics of the Cold War can instruct us on future conflicts and international policies.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, realists such as John Mearsheimer (1990) warned of the potential for disorder in a world without the clear structure of bipolarity. The stability that two superpowers provided was replaced with uncertainty. This perspective anticipated the challenges of unipolarity and the potential for the emergence of new global and regional powers. Consequently, the importance of maintaining a balance of power as a deterrent against the rise of potential hegemons became prominent in discourse.
The realist approach also underscores the notion that international institutions and agreements are ultimately dependent on the power distribution among states. For instance, Stephen Walt’s (1987) balance of threat theory, could explain the cohesion and disintegration of alliances once the Soviet threat evaporated. NATO’s persistence, despite the absence of the Soviet Union, defied simplistic realist expectations, but it can be understood through a consideration of new threats and the balancing strategies of smaller states seeking protection under the security umbrella of the United States.
Moreover, the end of the Cold War contributes to the realist understanding of state behavior in terms of survival. Kenneth Waltz (1979), a founder of neorealism, posits that the primary concern of states is to ensure their survival, which leads them to engage in power-maximizing behavior. The post-Cold War era has illustrated how the United States, despite being the lone superpower, continued to act in ways that were designed to preserve and extend its influence, consistent with realist theory.
Realism also anticipates the ways in which power transitions can lead to conflict. As new powers, like China and a resurgent Russia, have started to assert themselves on the global stage, the lessons of the Cold War become particularly relevant. The potential for a return to multipolarity suggests that the United States and its competitors might engage in a new power struggle reminiscent of Cold War dynamics, suggesting a timeless quality to realist principles.
While realism faced criticisms in the post-Cold War era – with some arguing that it failed to predict the peaceful end of the Cold War – it still offers insights into how states navigate an anarchic international system without a central authority. The durability of realist thought is partly attributable to its adaptability and its foundational assumption that power and security are the primary drivers of international relations.
In conclusion, the Cold War’s end not only signified a pivotal shift in global politics but also challenged and reinforced key realist assertions. The transition from bipolarity to unipolarity, the persistence and adaptation of alliances, and the American strategy post-Cold War have all served to affirm the relevance of a realist perspective in understanding the enduring nature of international politics. While new threats and actors have emerged, the fundamental lessons of power dynamics and state behavior that realism contributes remain influential in comprehending the past and anticipating future developments.
References:
real book (Gaddis (1972), The United States and the origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947):
Gaddis, J. L. (1978). The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. Columbia University Press.
real book (Jervis (2015), Perception and Misperception in International Politics):
Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press.
real book (Jervis (1978), Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma):
Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167-214.
real article (Kennan (1960), The Sources of Soviet Conduct by “X”):
Kennan, G. F. (1947). The Sources of Soviet Conduct. Foreign Affairs, 25(4), 566-582.
real book (Kissinger (1994), Diplomacy):
Kissinger, H. (1994). Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster.
real article (Mearsheimer (1990), Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War):
Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990). Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. International Security, 15(1), 5-56.
real book (Morgenthau (1948), Politics among Nations):
Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Alfred A. Knopf.
real article (Schweller (1994), Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In):
Schweller, R. L. (1994). Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. International Security, 19(1), 72-107.
real book (Schweller (1998), Deadly imbalances):
Schweller, R. L. (1998). Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest. Columbia University Press.
real article (Snyder (1984), The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics):
Snyder, G. H. (1984). The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. World Politics, 36(4), 461-495.
real article (Thucydides (1989), The Peloponnesian War):
Thucydides, & Hobbes, T. (1628). Eight Bookes of the Peloponnesian Warre. London: Imprinted for Henry Seile.
real book (Walt (1987), The Origins of Alliances):
Walt, S. M. (1987). The origins of alliances. Cornell University Press.
real book (Waltz (1979), Theory of international politics):
Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
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